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Living With the Ban on 
Nonrefundable Retainers: 
Cooperman's Scope, 
Meaning and Consequences 
BY LESTER BRICKMAN AND 
L A W R E N C E A. C U N N I N G H A M 
I 
n a case of first impression in the 
United States, the New York 
Court of Appeals in Matter of 
Cooperman earlier this year held 
that nonrefundable fee agree-
ments between lawyers and clients are 
unethical. 1 Although these retainers have 
in the past been most widely used by 
lawyers practicing criminal, bankruptcy 
and matrimonial law, the case has im-
portant consequences for lawyers in all 
areas of practice. Because the New York 
case can be expected to be followed by 
many other jurisdictions, it also has im-
portant consequences for lawyers around 
the country who have been using nonre-
fundable retainers. 2 
I. Cooperman's Scope and 
Meaning 
Since the opinion was issued in 
March, we have been consulted by nu-
merous lawyers, bar groups, clients and 
others for advice concerning the scope 
and meaning of the Court of Appeals' 
ruling and on the practical implications 
for lawyers having used such devices. 
These consultations led us to believe that 
a brief overview of Cooperman 's scope 
and meaning, as well as its practical 
implications, would be desirable. 
Basis of the Decision: Client Discharge 
Rule 
Cooperman follows from the bed-
rock principle that the attorney-client 
relationship is fiduciary in nature.3 The 
relationship's effectiveness depends on 
a client having trust and confidence in 
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her lawyer. When a client loses that trust 
and confidence, the fiduciary basis of 
the relationship is undermined and its 
purpose impaired. To protect against this 
corrosive possibility, it has long been 
the clear and express policy of most 
jurisdictions in the United States that a 
client is entitled to terminate the 
attorney-client relationship and agree-
ment at any time, for any reason, how-
ever arbitrary.' The Cooperman Court 
resoundingly reaffirmed this fundamen-
tal principle as the law and policy of 
New York State.5 
As a logically necessary corollary 
to this rule, a client cannot be put in a 
worse position by exercising her right to 
terminate the attorney-client agreement.6 
Indeed, as the New York Court of 
Appeals emphasized in the landmark 
case of Manin v. Camp, and as the 
Cooperman Court reemphasized, because 
imposing a penalty in such circumstances 
may deter a client from invoking the 
right to discharge her attorney, when a 
client discharges her lawyer, the retainer 
agreement is not breached.7 
In such a case, the client simply 
exercises a contract right implied by 
public policy, and a discharged lawyer's 
recovery upon termination by his client 
is determined based on the principles of 
quantum meruit.8 As a result, efforts by 
lawyers to keep more than such an 
amount, as by charging nonrefundable 
retainers, are impermissible and unen-
forceable. Some confusion has stirred, 
however, with respect to precisely what 
a nonrefundable retainer is. 
1 Matier of Coopermon, 83 N.Y.2d 465 
(1994). 
2 Indeed, the logic and policy of 
Cooperman is sweef)ing the notion. E.g., 
Wong v. Kennedy, 853 F. Supp. 73 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); AF/.AC, Inc. v. Williams, 
444 S.E.2d 314 (Go. 1994); Sormienlo v. 
Meyer & Greenfield, N. Y.LJ., May_ 9, 1994 
at p . 29 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Apr. 4, 1994); In re 
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. 
Supp. 463, n. 27 (E.D. Va. 1994); see also 
Cuyahoga Co. Bar As&'n v. Olcocha, 632 
N.E.2d 1284 (Oh. Sup. Ct. 1994); but see 
Bd. Prof. Resp., Sup. Ct. Tenn., Formal Ethics 
Op. 92.f-128(b) (Sept. 10, 1993) (reaffirming 
earlier opinion approving nonrefundable 
retainers despite lower court opinion in 
Cooperman). 
3 This trust-based theory of the 
attorney<lient relationship is deYeloped fully 
in Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: 
Impermissible Under fiduciary, Statutory and 
Contrad Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149 
(1988) . 
'Mortin v. Comp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 
N.E. 46 (1916); see also Lester Brickman & 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable 
Retainers Revisited, 72 North Carolina L. Rev. 
1, 7 n. 24 ( 1993) (citing cases from 32 states 
adopting the client discharge rule from Mortin 
v. Camp and concluding tliot it has "become 
the notional rule, conquering the jurisdictions 
with its force of reasoning") . 
' Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 472 
("public policy recognizes o client's right to 
terminate the ottorney<lient relationship at any 
time with or without cause") (emphasis in 
original) . 
• See Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee 
When the Client Discharges o Contingent Fee 
Attorney, 41 Emory L. Rev. 367 (1992) . 
7 Mortin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 
N.E . 46 (1916); Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 
472 . 
1 E.g., Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 473 & 
475; Jacobson v. Sossower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 
993 (1985); Loi Ling Cheng v. Modonsky 
Leasing Co., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 457-58 
(1989); Teichner v. W &J Ho/steins, Inc., 64 
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Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. Cunningham are both law 
professors at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University, New York City. They 
have written extensively on many 
legal subjects, and have 
co-authored two law review articles 
on nonrefundable retainers. The 
professors also filed a brief amicus 
curiae in Cooperman. Their writings 
on the subject have provided much 
of the intellectual and legal 
framework for judicial opinions 
concerning the legal and ethical 
validity of nonrefundable retainers. 
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Problems of Definition 
The Cooperman Court expressly 
limited its holding to "special nonrefund-
able retainers," saying "we intend no 
effect or disturbance with respect to other 
types of appropriate and ethical fee 
agreements.''9 The Court then announced, 
without defining its terms, that 
"[m)inimum fee arrangements and gen-
eral retainers that provide for fees, not 
laden with the nonrefundability impedi-
ment irrespective of any services, will 
continue to be valid and not subject in 
and of themselves to professional disci-
pline. "10 Because we have perceived 
some confusion in interpreting the mean-
ing of these various kinds of fee arrange-
ments, it is important to define each of 
them and to evaluate their effect upon 
the client discharge rule and hence their 
Validity. II 
A special retainer is an agreement 
between attorney and client in which the 
client agrees to pay the attorney a speci-
fied fee in exchange for specified ser-
vices to be rendered. The fee may be 
calculated on an hourly, fixed, percent-
age or other basis and may be payable 
either in advance or as billed. Subject to 
the provisions of DR 2-106 governing 
the reasonableness of legal fees, these 
arrangements pose no special ethical 
problems, and do not impair the client 
discharge right. 12 
A general retainer-sometimes 
referred to as the classic retainer-is an 
agreement between attorney and client 
in which the client agrees to pay a fixed 
sum to the attorney in exchange for the 
attorney's promise to be available to 
perform, at an agreed price, any legal 
services (which may be of any kind or 
of a specified kind) that arise during a 
specified period. Since the general 
retainer fee is given in exchange for 
availability, and not for the rendition of 
legal services, it is a charge separate from 
fees incurred for services actually 
rendered. In other words, such fees are 
"earned when paid" because payment is 
made for availability. As a result, they 
also do not impair the client's right to 
discharge freely .13 
The nonrefundable retainer is a sub-
species of the special retainer and has 
nothing in common with the general 
retainer as defined above. While we have 
used the term "nonrefundable special 
retainer" to describe this fee payment, 
the Cooperman Court used the term 
"special nonrefundable retainer" to 
describe the identical device. A non-
refundable special retainer is a fee paid 
to a lawyer by a client in advance of 
services to be rendered, and denominated 
by the lawyer as nonrefundable in the 
event the client terminates the relation-
ship, even if the work has not been done. 
Nonrefundable retainers arise only in 
conjunction with the rendering of speci-
fied services for a specified fee, and pur-
port to allow a lawyer to keep an advance 
payment without regard to whether the 
services contemplated are rendered. 
Because a nonrefundable retainer is 
a fee paid to a lawyer by a client in 
advance of services to be rendered, once 
it is paid, a client is no longer free to 
discharge her lawyer but instead is held 
hostage to that advance payment-dis-
charging her lawyer costs the client the 
amount of the advance payment that has 
not been earned. Hence, nonrefundable 
retainers-in both design and effect-
penalize a client for discharging her 
lawyer, in contravention of the spirit and 
the letter of the client discharge rule. 14 
Cooperman therefore expressly and 
emphatically condemns these nonrefund-
able retainers. 
Minimum fee agreements typically 
provide that a lawyer will work on an 
hourly or fixed fee basis to complete a 
particular task. For example, the agree-
ment may provide that, while the task 
will likely require twenty hours of work, 
9 Cooperman, 83 N .Y.2d at 476 
(citation omitted). 
,o Id. 
11 Nonrefundable retainers ore also 
unethical because they •transgress• distinct 
provisions of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, including DR 2-11 0(A)(3), DR 
2-110(B)(4) and DR 2-106(A). Cooperman, 
83 N.Y.2d at 471 . These rules ore ultimately 
inspired by the fundamental principles 
underlying the client discharge rule . For 
discussion of these rules in the context of 
Cooperman, see Brickman & Cunningham, 72 
North Carolina L. Rev. at 1 8-19. 
12 On some of the ethical problems posed 
by percentage fees, see Lester Brickman, 
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: 
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 
UCLA L. Rev. 29 (1989) . 
13 See Brickman & Cunningham, 72 North 
Carolina L. Rev. at 8-9, 24 (citing authorities 
for the foregoing propositions) . 
" Anything that inhibits the exercise of the 
client discharge right, including any retainer 
agreement between attorney and client, 
cannot be sustained . See Demov, Mo"is, 
Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N .Y.2d 553, 
557 (1981); Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 472 . 
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even if it is completed in fewer hours, the 
fee will still be the twenty hour fee. The 
agreement may also provide, however, that 
the fee can be more than the minimum 
fee, if the task requires more hours or 
effort than contemplated. This kind of 
minimum fee also raises no inherent ethi-
cal objections. In such a case, the client' s 
right to discharge the lawyer prior to 
completion of the service and be liable 
only in quantum meruit is unimpaired.15 
Application of Cooperman 
Although the ban announced in 
Cooperman does not apply to general 
retainers and minimum fee arrangements 
of the kind just described, 16 it would be a 
mistake to understand the case to mean 
that characterizing a particular arrange-
ment as either a general retainer or a mini-
mum fee renders the arrangement ethical 
and free from scrutiny. While the Court 
said its ruling applies only to what it called 
"special nonrefundable retainers" and not 
to other kinds of fee arrangements, the 
Court was careful to limit its imprimatur 
of other kinds of fees to those that do not 
impair the client discharge right. It said 
these other kinds of fee arrangements are 
permissible but only if "not laden with 
the nonrefundability impediment irrespec-
tive of any services." 17 
It is this "nonrefundability impedi-
ment" that interferes with the client 
discharge right and renders the nonre-
fundable retainer unethical and unen-
forceable per se. Consequently, every 
fee agreement that has the same effect 
is also flatly forbidden, no matter what 
it is called. Rather than investigating the 
names given to particular agreements, 
therefore, the test for determining the 
validity of a retainer agreement must 
focus on its economic structure. If the 
arrangement impairs the client discharge 
right, then it is unenforceable and 
unethical. 
Under this test, for example, an 
arrangement nominally characterized as 
a "minimum fee," but that also purports 
to allow an attorney to keep an advance 
payment without regard to whether the 
services contracted for are rendered, is 
invalid because it impairs the client dis-
charge right. In effect, it is simply a 
nonrefundable retainer in disguise-it 
contains a "nonrefundability impedi-
ment." Minimum fees of this variety are 
therefore unethical and unenforceable.18 
52 I September/October 1994 
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Similarly, a "hybrid" special-general 
retainer agreement is also impermissible 
under Cooperman because it too includes 
a "nonrefundability impediment." A 
hybrid is an agreement providing that part 
or all of a fee denominated as a "general 
retainer" is to be applied to defray the 
costs of any services actually performed. 
A typical version of the hybrid, for 
example, might call for a $10,000 fee to 
be paid in advance, with the agreement 
that any progress is to be charged against 
that advance. This then would constitute 
a general retainer "laden with the 
nonrefundability impediment irrespective 
of services."19 A client's right to discharge 
would be impaired by such a device 
because terminating the lawyer before 
those services were rendered would result 
in forfeiture of some or all of the advance 
payment, in violation of Cooperman. 
A variant of such a hybrid could be 
designed by specifying, for example, that 
$7,000 of the $10,000 advance fee pay-
ment is to be a general retainer, given in 
exchange for availability and not subject 
to offset, and $3,000 of the advance fee 
payment is to be a special retainer, given 
in advance for and charged off against 
specific services actually rendered. While 
Cooperman did not expressly address this 
or other variations on the hybrid, we 
believe courts following the logic and 
policy of Cooperman will be Jed to evalu-
ate their validity by observing a rebut-
table presumption that the fee was given 
for services, and not for availability.20 This 
is because it can be expected that most 
clients would not understand or intend to 
characterize the $7,000 as for availability. 
In short, lawyers should expect that both 
the hybrid and all variations on it will 
receive the same scrutiny as applied to 
nonrefundable retainers that are clear on 
their face. 
No Waiver of Client Discharge Right 
Lawyers should also avoid the temp-
tation to seek a waiver of the client dis-
charge right from clients, because we 
believe such waivers are also unenforce-
able. In addition to the threat of under-
mining the principles that justify the client 
discharge rule, Cooperman indicates that 
this right cannot be waived. 
The Court observed that under DR 
2-110(A)(3) and (B)(4), "an attorney is 
prohibited from keeping any part of a 
pre-paid fee that has not been earned 
because of discharge by the client.'92 1 It 
went on to say, in light of that rule, that 
"it is reasonable to conclude also that an 
attorney may not negotiate and keep fees 
such as those at issue hcre.'922 By expressly 
prohibiting a lawyer from negotiating a 
nonrefundable retainer, the Court is saying 
that even client consent will not insulate 
such an agreement from scrutiny and 
rejection. In other words, Cooperman 
announces that the client discharge right 
may not be waived, a result that is of 
course consistent with the treatment of 
most client rights arising out of the 
fiduciary nature of the attorney-client 
relationship. 
II. Consequences of Coopemum 
for Past and Future Fee 
Agreements 
Apart from recognizing the scope 
of Cooperman, which covers all fee 
arrangements that impair the client 
discharge right, it is also important for 
lawyers having used such devices in the 
15 This definition of minimum fees, which 
we commended to the attention of the 
Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in 
Matrimonial Actions, is the one that the 
Appellale Division defined as P.9rmissible in 
its rules prohibiting nonrefundable retainers in 
matrimonial actions. N .Y. Comp. Codes R. & 
Regs. tit. 22 §_.4 (1993) . 
16 The lower court decision in Cooperman 
was understood by many lo hold that all 
• nonrefundable retainers,• including general 
retainers, had been prohibited. See Stephen 
Gillers, All Non-Refundable Retainers Are Not 
Creoted Equol, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 3, 1993. We 
have previously explained our view that this is 
not what the Appellale Division held. See 
lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Clarification Offered on lawyers' Retainers 
(Letter to the Editor), N. Y.LJ., Mar. 1, 1993. 
It is olso not what the Court of Appeals held. 
17 Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 476. 
18 This "minimum lee" subterfuge a~peors 
in N .Y. State Bor Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. 
Ethics, Op. 599 ( 1989), which contains the 
following linguistic legerdemain: 
We oddress in this opinion the 
ethicol propriety of an agreement 
covering o specific legol matter that calls 
for an advonce f?OYlll9"t of a minimum 
fee that is not refundable to a client if the 
representation ends before the attorney 
expends the requisite number of hours 
that would, at the time charges specified 
in the retainer agreement, eom the 
minimum fee. 
Id. at 3. This, of course, describes a 
nonrefundable retainer, while attempting to 
distinguish and legitimate the device by 
colling it a minimum lee. Both are uneihicol 
ond unenforceable under Cooperman. 
19 Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 476. 
20 See Brickman & Cunningham, 72 North 
Carolina L. Rev. at 25-28. 
21 Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 474-75 . 
22 Id. at 475 (emphasis added) . 
past to consider how to deal with the 
consequences of having done so, and to 
devise proper means for new fee arrange-
ments now that it is clear that nonre-
fundable retainers are impermissible. 
Jurisdictional Scope of Cooperman 
The Cooperman Court was careful 
to emphasize that it was declaring the 
ethical invalidity of nonrefundable re-
tainers in a disciplinary proceeding, 
rather than in a civil fee dispute between 
a lawyer and client.23 The Court quali-
fied its decision as follows: 
Since we decide the precise 
issue in this case in a disciplinary 
context only, we imply no views 
with respect to the wider array of 
factors by which attorneys and 
clients may have fee dispute 
controversies resolved. Traditional 
criteria, including the factor of the 
actual amount of services ren-
dered, will continue to govern 
those situations (see, DR 
2-106[B]). Thus, while the special 
nonrefundable retainer agreement 
will be unenforceable and may 
subject an attorney to professional 
discipline, quantum meruit 
payment for services actually 
rendered will still be available and 
appropriate. 2-1 
It is possible to understand the fore-
going excerpt to mean that the 
Cooperman opinion has no application 
outside the disciplinary context. We 
believe this view is fundamentally mis-
taken, however. The Court expressly 
states that, in addition to subjecting a 
lawyer to disciplinary action, nonrefund-
able retainers are unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy. In civil cases 
where such nonrefundable retainers are 
challenged, therefore, the lawyer will 
have no right to enforce his agreement, 
but instead may claim only an amount 
equal to the reasonable value of his ser-
vices, in quantum meruit. In determin-
ing the quantum meruit amount, all the 
factors set forth in DR 2-106(8), gov-
erning the determination of reasonable 
legal fees, will be relevant. 
This interpretation of Cooperman 
was adopted by the Civil Court of the 
City of New York in Sarmiento v. Meyer 
& Greenfield. 25 It raises important 
~ 
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important questions concerning the 
obligations lawyers now have when dis-
charged by clients who have signed non-
refundable retainer agreements. 
Settlement After Discharge 
In Sarmiento, a client discharged her 
lawyer under a nonrefundable retainer 
agreement and sought a refund. The law-
yer refunded 50% of the advance and 
the client signed a release of the lawyer 
for any further claims, which the lawyer 
argued constituted an accord and satis-
faction. 26 Thereafter, the Cooperman 
decision was handed down and the cli-
ent asserted that the accord was invalid. 
In denying the lawyer's motion for sum-
mary judgment on that claim, the Court 
decided that the same principles under-
lying Cooperman also applied to deter-
mine the legal validity of the purported 
accord and satisfaction. Because the 
unethical nonrefundable retainer neces-
sarily formed the basis for negotiating 
the accord, the accord itself was unavoid-
ably infected by that device. In other 
words, since the accord was entered into 
before Cooperman was decided, the law-
yer could credibly have informed the cli-
ent that the lawyer had a right to keep 
the retainer. As a result, the accord was 
tainted by the same ethical problem as 
the underlying nonrefundable retainer, 
both of which were therefore unenforce-
able, and the lawyer was entitled only to 
collect in quantum meruit. 
In light of Cooperman and 
Sarmiento, lawyers negotiating settle-
ments of their fees after being 
discharged under a nonrefundable agree-
ment face a number of additional 
responsibilities. Any settlements of 
advance fee payments denominated as 
nonrefundable and entered into prior to 
Cooperman are inherently suspect for 
the reasons set forth in Sarmiento. 
Because a lawyer at that time could 
plausibly have claimed that he was 
entitled to keep the entire amount of the 
nonrefundable fee, any settlement under 
which the client accepted less than the 
advance net of the reasonable value of 
the services is unenforceable. Subject 
to the applicable statute of limitations, 
therefore, such lawyers are vulnerable 
to claims by those clients attacking the 
accord and satisfaction. 
With respect to settlements being 
entered into after Cooperman, lawyers 
should take care to inform the client that 
she now has a clear right to a return of 
the entire portion of the advance fee that 
has not been earned. To obtain maximal 
assurance that such a settlement will not 
be subject to later attack, the lawyer 
should take several steps. First, as noted, 
he should advise the discharging client 
that she has the right to a full refund of 
the advance fee, net of quantum meruit. 
Second, the lawyer should provide the 
client with a detailed billing statement 
supporting the amount he is claiming in 
quantum meruit. That statement should 
be prepared with reference to the factors 
set forth in DR 2-106, concerning the 
reasonableness of legal fees. Finally, it 
may be prudent for the lawyer to advise 
the client that she should consider hiring 
another lawyer to review the proposed 
settlement. 27 
Advance Fees to Protect the Lawyer 
Cooperman expressly recognizes 
the need to balance the interests of law-
yers with those of clients, and to protect 
both from unfair advantage at the hands 
of the other. 28 In Cooperman, this meant 
protecting the client through the client 
discharge right and protecting the lawyer 
by providing relief in quantum meruit 
even where he has acted impermissibly. 
Another pair of devices are designed to 
accomplish a similar balancing of inter-
ests between lawyer and client: the 
advance fee payment and the client trust 
account. 
Cooperman has no effect on a 
lawyer's right to insist on an advance 
fee payment from a client at the outset 
of the representation. This gives the 
23 Id. al 471 (chorac:1erizing Jacobson v. 
Sos,owwr, 66 N.Y.2d 991 (1985), as a •r.. 
di~ case• and ref.rring to Cooperman as 
a discie>linory matter•). 
24 Coopermo_n, 83 N.Y.2d at 475 
l•m~hosis added). 
5 N.Y.LJ., May 9, 1994 alp. 29 
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Apr. 4, 1994). 
26 The client asserted that tlie lawyer hod 
worked only one hour prior to discharge, 
although the lawyer denied this. 
27 This advice is probably in the 
discharged lawyer's interests, moreover, 
because the fact of discharge does not ipso 
fodo terminate the attorney-client relationship. 
Consequently, during the settlement 
negotiations, the discharged lawyer may well 
continue to owe fiduciary obligations to the 
client. If the client retains another lawyer to 
advise her in those negotiations, however, the 
discharged attorney should be relieved of 
those duties. 
28 Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 473 . 
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lawyer assurance that he will be paid for 
services rendered. However, any such 
advance fee payment must be deposited 
into a client trust account pursuant to 
DR 9-102.29 
Under DR 9-102(A), if the client 
disputes a lawyer's fee, then the lawyer 
may not withdraw that part of the fee 
which is disputed by the client until the 
dispute is finally resolved. Depositing an 
advance fee payment into the lawyer's 
general office account, rather than to the 
client trust account, would strip the cli-
ent of this unwaivable right under DR 
9-102(A), just as charging a nonrefund-
able retainer would strip a client of the 
unwaivable client discharge right. As a 
result, a substantial majority of bar 
associations opining on the matter have 
declared that advance fees must be 
deposited to the trust account. 30 
In connection with many of the 
kinds of law practices in which nonre-
fumlable retainers have been used in the 
past, the advance fee payment/trust 
account approach will protect the inter-
est of the lawyer in assuring compensa-
tion for services rendered, while at the 
same time protecting clients by preserv-
ing both the client discharge rule and 
the fee dispute rule. 
~ 
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As a matter of practice, lawyers 
obtaining an advance fee should find it 
desirable at the outset of a representa-
tion to prepare a schedule of progress, 
specifying the steps to be taken that will 
earn portions of the advance fee, and 
give a copy of this schedule to the client. 
In the criminal defense context, for ex-
ample, a lawyer requiring an advance 
fee payment of $7,500 could specify that 
it was for the entire representation and 
further that after entering an appearance 
and making a plea, $2,000 would be 
earned; the next $2,000 after the bail 
hearing; the next $3,500 after the trial; 
and so on. 
Conclusion 
We understand that many lawyers 
who have read Cooperman lament its 
lack of crystalline guidance concerning 
their own past or future fee agreements. 
While this concern is legitimate, it is 
simply the natural consequence of any 
judicial decision resolving a major and 
previously unsettled issue of vital 
importance to all lawyers. As 
Cooperman was the first court in the 
country to confront directly the ethical 
problems nonrefundable retainers pose, 
the lines the Court has drawn inevitably 
leave indeterminate issues at the mar-
gins. Over time these issues will be clari-
fied and resolved, however, as the 
process is joined by other state supteme 
courts and law review writers. 
We note, moreover, that the Court 
also took care to express its confidence 
that the Justices of the Appellate Divi-
sion, who bear responsibility for apply-
ing Cooperman, will "in the highest 
tradition of their regulatory and 
adjudicatory roles ... exercise their 
unique disciplinary responsibility with 
prudence."31 Accordingly, while we 
sympathize with lawyers facing the un-
certainty left in Cooperman 's wake, we 
too expect that the Appellate Divisions, 
as well as the Grievance Committees, 
will act with discretion and responsibil-
ity in distinguishing between retainer 
agreements that are valid and those 
which, because they impair the client 
discharge right, are not. ~ 
29 See Lesler Brickman, The Advance Fee 
Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be 
Deposiled to the Client Trust Account or to the 
General Office Account?, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 
647 (1989) . 
30 Id. at 650. 
31 Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d at 476. 
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a conduit for givmg sometbiug back 10 our cha- . ·uumber of yems. . .. 
ished profession. · Call Thomas Pombonyo of Bcrtholon-Rowland 
Now, by utilizing the tax~preferred vehicle of a Corp., our NYSBA Insurance Administrator, to 
life insurance policy, you can magnify, many times learn more about giving a gift of life insurance: 
over, the ultimate value of your gift. In addition, 212-966-9400 or 1-800-727-7770, Extension 370. 
when properly constructed, your premium con-
tributions are tax-deductible while the insurance 
benefit, once paid, can reduce the 
taxes levied on your estate. 
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